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1. Introduction 
Numerous high-tech products and technologies are invented to improve life, 
including physical software and cyber-physical systems in the information 
technology field. Reliance on these types of systems has been increasing. Today 
these systems store vast amounts of information. However, security of these 
systems has become important and is being actively researched. 
The concept of an attack tree provides a clear way to de-scribe possible 
attacks and safety threats for a system. We strive to apply the attack tree concept 
to design a safety system. An attack tree has a structure similar to a tree as it 
includes different levels of nodes – root nodes and leaf nodes. Root nodes 
represent attack targets, while leaf nodes denote attack methods. 
A root indicates a target goal, and the leaves represent basic attacks with no 
further refinements in an attack tree. A successful attack would satisfy the roots. 
That is, if the child nodes are true, then the direct parent nodes are true. 
According to the attack tree model, each node can have different metrics, and 
finding the minimum value of the sum of the metrics passing through the path 
from the tree's bottom to the top can indicate a system's attack motion [1]. In 
real cases, attack trees have huge and complicated structures. One attack tree 
may be composed of thousands of nodes. Due to the complexity of systems, 
even a specialist can make mistakes while building an attack tree or analyzing 
its structure, resulting in a chaotic incomprehensible attack tree.  
Generally, an attack tree connects a child node to its parent node. Thus, a 
child and parent have a vertical relationship. However, some relations exist 
between horizontal nodes. If the horizontal relationships between nodes are 
considered, the relationship definition of the nodes on the attack tree becomes 
more complicated. Additionally, the efficiency becomes lower or defenses 
overlap. If we can redefine the horizontal relation-ships on an attack tree and 
re-build the tree, a clearer attack tree with a strict structure could be derived, 
especially for complicate cases.  
Herein we present a new method to rebuild the initial at-tack tree by the 
Interpretive Structural Modeling procedure (abbr. ISM). The re-built attack tree 
can repair incorrect relation between parent-child nodes and it can effectively 
connect the relationship between nodes. Generating an attack tree with a clear 
structure can improve the efficiency of data analysis of a system's threat. We 
show a real example to verify the value of this method. 
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Section 2 explains the background of an attack tree and the motivating 
example. Section 3 presents the related work on attack trees. Section 4 how our 
method works and implements our method using a running example, and 
Section 5 presents discusses our method. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Motivating Example 
Before explaining our method, we would like to introduce our motivating 
example. In the running example, there is a data computer in a building. As 
shown in Fig. 1a, this building includes two rooms (room1 and room2) with two 
locked doors (door1 and door2). There are two keys (key1 and key2) to open 
the doors. A camera monitors door2 to make sure no one enters room2. 
However, the window can be opened freely and is not within the camera’s view. 
The goal for an attacker is to obtain computer data without detection on the 
camera.  
 
 
(a)Floor plan                          (b)Attack scenarios 
Fig. 1. Example of a figure caption 
Based on these conditions, we can draw three successful scenarios (Fig. 1b). 
The first is enter room2 through the window (orange dotted line). The second is 
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to use both key1 and key2; the attacker enters room1 using key1 to open door1. 
Once in room1, the attacker disables the camera and then uses key2 to enter 
room2 (green dashed line).  The third scenario is the attacker hacks directly into 
the network (yellow solid line). An attack tree can be used to clearly model 
these three scenarios. 
This example is referenced by "Is My Attack Tree Correct?". That paper 
defines the correctness of an attack tree by nodes relations and confirms it by 
giving the opposite example, which does not satisfy the necessary and sufficient 
relationship between nodes. Herein we focus on how to revise an attack tree that 
does not satisfy the conditions and reduce the amount of detailed descriptions 
in the theorem proofs. We slightly adjust the model for ease of expression. 
 
2.2 Attack Tree 
There are numerous ways to initiate an attack, but most people do not realize 
this. Even if people are aware of such vulnerabilities, they know little about 
system security. Due to the increasing complexity of attack motions, it is 
becoming more difficult to prevent attacks. Defending against an attack based 
on an engineer’s own personal ability is problematic. “Security” must answer 
two questions: “Who will attack?” and “How long is security necessary?” Thus, 
a method to model threats against computer systems must be developed. If the 
attackers are known, then systems could be protected by presuming their ability 
and their attack target. By knowing the probability of attacking motions, a 
defense can be mounted by designing these countermeasures. These situations 
are why the "attack tree" method is needed. 
To analyze the security of an issue, the attack tree model must be selected. In 
our motivating example, we used three types of nodes: 
• OR: OR node means an alternative attack. One of the child nodes can be 
satisfied to attack a parent node. 
• AND: AND node means a conjunctive attack. All of the child nodes must 
be satisfied to attack the parent mode. 
• SAND: SAND node means a sequential attack. All of the child nodes 
must be satisfied in a specific order to attack the parent node. 
Fig. 2 expresses the three scenarios in Fig. 1b as an attack tree. To access the 
computer data, methods can be separated into physical attacks and network 
attacks. In the physical at-tack case, it can be further separated as go through 
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the door or the window. To use the door, the camera should be disabled before 
entering room2 (node type AND); to enter room2, door1 and door2 should be 
opened in sequence (node type SAND). The invade computer subtree can be 
separated to in-vade from wireless LAN or infection malware. These two nodes 
can be true if at least one of the leaf nodes is true (node type OR). 
 
Fig. 2. Attack tree expressed by scenario 
 
2.3 Define the Relationships between Nodes 
To discuss the relation of nodes, we define the Necessary and Sufficient 
Relationship between Parent-Child Nodes and the Horizontal Relationship 
1) Necessary and Sufficient Relationship between Parent-Child Nodes: The 
logic relationship between parent-child nodes is very important in an attack tree. 
Below are two relationship definitions between parent-child nodes from the at-
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tack tree to clarify the child nodes are conditions that must be satisfied to make 
the direct parent node true. 
a) Child nodes' commands must be a sufficient condition for the commands 
of parent nodes. For an "OR" node, the statement of the parent node is true when 
at least one of the child nodes is reached. For an "AND" node, the statement of 
the parent node is true when all child nodes are reached. 
b) A set of child nodes must be the necessary condition for the commands of 
parent nodes. Based on the premise that the attack tree has integrity when the 
node type is "OR", the un-ion of child nodes is true if the parent node is true, 
but when the node type is "AND", the intersection of child nodes is true if the 
parent node is true. 
2) Horizontal relationship: The structure of an attack tree is like a tree. The 
connections between nodes are usually defined as parent-child relationships 
(vertical relationships). However, some relations exist between nodes, which 
are at the same level. Such relations, which are usually ignored in the 
relationship definition, are horizontal relationships between nodes. To redefine 
the relationships in a tree structure, surplus nodes make it more complicated, 
reducing the efficiency when set-ting the defense strategy. Horizontal relations 
are separated into two types as shown below: 
a) Additional contributions: One node can be satisfied if another node on a 
different branch is true. 
b) Similar nodes: The same attack occurs from two leaf nodes. 
 
2.4 Analyze Attack Tree 
There are multiple ways to analyze attack trees. Schneier [2] provided a 
method to realize loopholes of the system by estimating the different node 
variables. In attack trees, every node has its own values, which might be 
continuous or Boolean. Nodes are decided by different variables such as the 
lowest qualified attack path for equipment, cheapest attack path, highest success 
rate attack path, and lowest ability attack path. We can also set different weights 
for variables to get the lowest integrated cost attack tree by the characteristics 
of the system. In an attack tree, the root nodes represent the attack target, and 
the child nodes are an attack or a parent node's sub-goal. A leaf node represents 
an attack that cannot be disassembled. 
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When these conditions are combined, Gn, which stands for target node, can 
be defined. An stands for leaf node (an attack). λ(n) represents the variable cost 
at point n. λ denotes a variable for risk, skill, or other factors. For example, 
Risk(Aa) can be considered as the risk cost of attack node a. For a target node 
Gn, there are Gx, Gy sub-nodes, and the type of node is OR. The relation 
function is described as: 𝜆 𝐺𝑛 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜆 𝐺𝑥 , 𝜆 𝐺𝑦  
In Fig. 3a, which shows a very simple attack tree with a target of "reach 
room2", there are two attacks: "go through the door" or "go through the 
window". We can use the symbols in Fig. 3b to derive the relation function as: 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝐺𝑎) = 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝐴𝑏), 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝐴𝑐)} 
The minimum risk path is chosen between nodes Ab and Ac. When Risk(Ab) 
is bigger than Risk(Ac), the minimum risk path is Path(Ga, Ac). However, if the 
parent-child relations are the opposite (Fig. 3c), then the relation function is: 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝐺𝑏) 	= 	𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝐴𝑎), 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝐴𝑐)} 
Thus, the minimum risk path can be chosen between nodes Aa and Ac. When 
Risk(Aa) is greater than Risk(Ac), then the minimum risk path is Path(Gb, Aa). 
We found that this path is not the path of "go through the window", which is 
actually the minimum risk path of the system. 
 
            (a) correct attack tree         (b) Indicate the nodes    (c)parent-child relations opposite 
Fig. 3. Example of analyze an incorrect attack tree 
 
In Fig. 4a, there are three nodes from the top to bottom: "reach room2"，"go 
through the door" and "unlock door2", and all of them satisfied the definition of 
Necessary and Sufficient Relationship between Parent-Child Nodes. We 
changed Fig. 4a to Fig. 4b by symbolization. When we analyze Fig. 4b, we just 
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need to analyze Risk(Ac) for getting Risk(Ga). We put figure 4b's node c on the 
position of node b's siblings purposely, and adding node d: "get key2", which 
has the same relations as node c. While analyzing the attack tree on Fig. 4c, we 
need to analyze these three nodes of risk for each three paths. Although it would 
get the same result probably from Risk(Ac) and Risk(Ad), it could cost much 
more time to analyze the variable value of surplus nodes.  
 
(a) correct attack tree     (b) Indicate the nodes          (c)with horizontal relation-ship 
         Fig. 4. Example of analyze attack tree with missing horizontal relationship 
 
By the method from this thesis, we define Necessary and Sufficient 
Relationship between Parent-Child Nodes and some ignorable relations 
between horizontal nodes. When analyzers find out these relations, he would 
re-judge the relationship between nodes and restructure the attack tree. 
Consider the physical attack portion of Fig. 2. To satisfy the node "go through 
the door", two conditions are necessary: "deactivate camera" and "reach room2". 
However, the condition "reach the room2 " can be achieved when either "go 
through the door" or "go through the window" is true. Based on the result, it can 
be said that the condition in this case is a necessary condition but not a sufficient 
condition. In other words, there are some obvious logical gaps in the attack tree. 
Thus, the attack tree should be revised. 
Consider the invade the computer part portion in Fig. 2. Here "WEP crack" 
is a child-node belonging to the node "in-vade from wireless LAN". However, 
it can be viewed as child-node belonging to its siblings-node -- "password 
crack" be-cause the "password crack" would be true if node "WEP crack" is 
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completed. Ignoring the relationship of additional contributions, makes the 
attack tree more complicated by increasing of amount of attack paths, reducing 
the efficiency of setting the defense strategy. In the "Infection malware" subtree, 
it can be observed that node "disguised as normal software" and node "drive by 
download" are the same attack on the system. These kinds of designs are messy 
and waste defense resources by over-comprehending the values of the attack 
motions. To ad-dress these problems, nodes need to be redefined or combined. 
In a real situation, the attack tree would be a huge system with tons of nodes. 
To prevent the aforementioned problems, the tree’s path needs to have a clear 
structure to elucidate the relations between nodes. In the next section, we offer 
a new way to re-build an attack tree with incorrect relationships between parent-
child nodes and analyze the horizontal relationships of its nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Related Work 
Earlier works introduced the concept of an attack tree. Salter et al. [3] 
described how to characterize adversaries and map vulnerabilities of an 
information system. Schneier [2] presented attack tree modeling and analysis 
by considering cost; their tree can determine where a system is vulnerable. 
Jurgenson and Willemson [4] extended the multi-parameter attack tree model 
by considering the skill level, cost, and feasibility of an attacker to work with 
interval estimates instead of point estimates. They also discussed how to choose 
the optimal or an economically justified security level. Jurgenson and Wil-
lemson [5] extended the standard attack tree, which can order to the attacker’s 
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decision-making process. Based on a sequence attack tree, they proposed an 
algorithm to compute the attacker’s expected outcome. To reduce the visual 
complexity of an attack graph, Noel et al. [6] described a number of new attack 
graph visualization techniques, and their method can be applied alone or 
combined into coordinated attack graph views. Despite being an intuitive aid in 
threat analysis, attack trees have yet to be provided with unambiguous 
semantics. Maui and Oostdjk [7] used mapping of attack suites to be provided 
denotational semantics, which are abstracted from the internal structure of an 
attack tree to help participants precisely under-stand how attack trees can be 
manipulated during construction and analysis. 
Attack trees can be also used in copyright protection of e-commerce 
protocols. Higuero M. V. et al. [8][9] provided a model called SecDP to solve 
the threat of ambiguity and avoid MITM attacks. They are also used in the 
mobile system fields. Duhoe Kim et al. [10] used an attack tree to build the 
analysis for a LOG analysis system to avoid being attacked on Android OS 
smart phones. The attack tree was separated for the pre-phase, which carried out 
the steps before an attack, and the post-phase, which detected malware. It has 
also been used in smart cars. Although few hacking events occurring in a smart 
car system, it should be noted that various security threats are invading 
electronic systems, especially for automobiles that can be connected into 
external networks. HeeKyung Kong et al. [11] proposed a method by modeling 
a hacking attack logically and creating a security risk assessment frame-work 
to defend, evaluate, and categorize the security threats and vulnerabilities by 
attack tree analysis. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
平成 30年度修士論文  早稲田大学基幹理工学研究科 
情報理工・情報通信専攻 深澤研究室 
――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
 
12 
 
 
4. Approach 
    We present a method that not only solves problems to re-pair the incorrect 
relations between parent-child nodes but also re-defines horizontal relationships 
between nodes on different branches. Our method provides a clear, complete 
structure of the attack tree through Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM) 
procedure. 
4.1 Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM) 
The first experiment was evaluating the method in terms of reading 
comprehension and coding skills. Twelve subjects with some experience in 
programming were invited through Twitter to participate. The subjects 
consisted of students, programmers, and other people from different jobs. All 
were familiar with Java, but none had experience with Swift. They were 
randomly divided into two groups: A and B. Group A did not have translational 
support, but group B did. They were asked to do self-study using Jasmin, then 
their knowledge of Swift language was tested in terms of reading 
comprehension questions and coding tasks. 
ISM is a method to confirm complex relations between items by modeling. 
For complex issues or systems, the number of items is huge and the relations 
between items are complicated. To express the relations more precisely, we use 
ISM to present the relations between items directly and indirectly. By 
considering the analyzing issue and system, items are initially defined as apexes 
Vi and Vj ( i=1, 2, 3 …；j=1, 2, 3 … ) for ISM. The edge with an arrow (Vi, Vj) 
expresses the relations between two items. A matrix, which is used to express 
the connection status for every pair item, is called a Relation Matrix (A) and it 
provides a structural self-interaction matrix (SSIM). Afterward, a reachability 
matrix (RX) from SSIM is obtained by calculations. Finally, we can derive a 
new model from RX by level partitions. ISM is a very efficient method. Because 
it is based on different situations, the number of relations between items can be 
reduced by 50–80% [12]. Additionally, it is a useful tool considering and 
thinking more logically on complex issues and situations. 
ISM includes the following steps: 
1)  Graph the Relation Matrix (A) of the analyzed system 
2) Generate the Reachability Matrix (RX) through a trans-formation of the 
Relation Matrix 
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3) Level Partitions 
4) Digraph 
Step 1: Graph the Relation Matrix (A): In ISM, a participant or expert familiar 
with the analysis issue must identify the contextual relations among items. 
Based on these relations, Relation Matrix A = {aij | i, j=1,2,···, n}is created to 
express all direct binary relationships. The value of n is the number of nodes 
from the system. All elements are listed in the rows and columns of a table. If 
two elements have a direct relation, enter 1 on the table grid. Otherwise, enter 
0. If the column direction is defined as the predecessor node, then enter 1 on a12 
when V1 points to V2 similar to Fig. 5a. 
 
     (a)Relation Matrix (A)                                         (b) Power of SSIM is k 
Fig. 5. Example of A and RX 
 
Step 2: Generate the Reachability Matrix (RX): The Reach-ability Matrix 
(RX) is used to express whether the relationship between two specific items is 
direct or indirect. RX can be calculated as: 	 A + I 	≠ 𝐴 + 𝐼 ; ≠ ⋯ ≠ 𝐴 + 𝐼 = = 𝐴 + 𝐼 =>? 𝐸𝑞. 1 𝑅𝑋 = 𝐴 + 𝐼 = 𝐸𝑞. 2 
"I" is a Unit Matrix. (A+I) to the power of k is RX when (A+I) to the power 
of k equals (A+I) to the power of (k+1). A power of SSIM = 1 means that a 
direct relationship exists between discussed items (the connecting route is 1). A 
power of SSIM = 2 means that the discussed items are connected with a 
maximum of 2 routes (passes 1 point). In other words, like in Fig. 5b, when the 
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degree of SSIM is k, the items are connected with at most k routes, and pass 
through at most (k-1) items. 
Step 3: Level Partitions: We can find the reachability sets and antecedent sets 
from every point (element) for the final reachability matrix. A reachability set 
is defined as a set composed of itself and points that it can reach. An antecedent 
set is defined as a set composed of itself and points that can reach it. We can 
obtain the intersection between these two sets from all elements, and get the 
different elements' levels. If the reachability set and intersection set of the 
element are the same, then it would be a top level constructed by ISM. Top level 
elements can be deleted from the set to find the new top level from new set. 
This tracing step of the top levels is repeated until all of them are found. The 
level departure can help build the graph of ISM model. 
Step 4: Digraph: The final step is to draw a new model from the new obtained 
elements. First, we draw elements by level. For example, the top-level elements 
are the root nodes on the attack tree. Thus, they are put on the level first. Then 
the elements of the second level are located on tree's second level. This is 
repeated for the third, fourth level, ..., until all elements are added to the attack 
tree. Next the nodes are connected to the Predecessor node to get the final model 
while removing the indirect links. 
 
4.2 ISM on Attack Tree 
It is necessary to find a relation between elements in the ISM methodology. 
To reach the goal, the nature of the contextual relationships among the factors 
must be identified carefully. To analyze the factors, a contextual relationship of 
"leads to" or "influences" must be chosen. This means that one factor influences 
another factor. After confirming the relations be-tween parent-child nodes, we 
can use the ISM method to ex-press an attack tree. 
The proposed method includes the following steps (Fig. 6):    
1)  Indicate the nodes 
2) Re-Judge the relationship between nodes and graph the Relation Matrix 
(A) 
3) Generate the Reachability Matrix (RX) through a transformation of the 
Relation Matrix(A) 
4) Level Partitions 
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5) Digraph 
 
Fig. 6. Overview of our approach  
 
Step 1: Indicate the nodes: In this step, all related nodes are expressed and 
displayed by symbols. Here Fig. 2 is used as an example. To reduce the 
computational complexity, the attack tree is separated into two subtrees: 
Physical Access in Fig. 7a and Invade the Computer in Fig. 8a. 
 
4.2.1 Subtree Physical Access 
Step 2: Re-Judge the relationship between nodes and graph the Relation 
Matrix (A). 
Re-Judge the relationship between nodes: Analyzer should check the 
relationship between nodes: previously we mentioned that two parent-child 
relationships, "go through the door" and "reach room2", conflict with the 
definition Necessary and Sufficient Relationship between Parent-Child Nodes 
in the physical access attack part. However, if these are separated and 
considered separately, if "reach room2" is true, then "physical access" must be 
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true. Similarly, if "go through the door" or "go through the window" is true, 
then "reach room2" is true. To let all of the nodes in this subtree satisfy the 
Necessary and Sufficient Relationship between Parent-Child Nodes, we should 
modify the nodes' relations on an attack tree as follows (see Fig. 7b): Delete the 
connected line between N2 and N5 and add a line from N1 to N5 because the 
node "physical access" is true if the node "reach room2" is true. Moreover, add 
the lines N5 to N3 and N5 to N2 because "go through the window" or "go 
through the door" is a condition, which must be satisfied to make the node 
"reach room2" true. 
    
(a)Indicate the nodes              (b)Revise the relationship            (c)Arrange the structure 
                                               between parent-child nodes 
                                           Fig. 7. Subtree: Physical Access 
 
After revising the relationship between parent-child nodes, arrange the 
structure of the attack tree to be less confusing. "Reach room2" and "enter 
room2" are parent-child relations with the same word meaning. Thus, node8 
(enter room2) can be removed. We also change the node type AND to a direct 
vertical structure. For SAND, the later order points are the sufficient conditions 
for the former order points. Like the at-tack tree in Fig. 7c, node7 (unlock door2) 
is necessary for node2 (go through the door) to be true. Thereby, node4 
(deactivate the camera) must be true to let node7 (unlock door2) be true, and 
demanding node6 (unlock door1) must be true to let node4 (deactivate the 
camera) be true.  
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Graph the Relation Matrix (A): The table in Fig. 8a lists the direct 
relationships after re-judge the relationship between nodes of sub-tree physical 
access. 
Step 3: Generate the Reachability Matrix (RX): According to Eq. 1 and Eq. 
2, the Reachability Matrix can be calculated similar to that in Fig. 8b. 
 
    (a)Relation Matrix(A)                                           (b)Reachability Matrix(RX) 
Fig. 8. A and RX of Physical Access 
 
Step 4: Level Partitions: After obtaining the Reachability Matrix for each 
node, the reachability and antecedent sets are derived. Fig. 9 shows the result 
using the rule of Level Partitions. The table helps build the ISM model. 
Fig. 9. Level Partitions of Physical Access 
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Step 5: Digraph: In Fig. 13a, a new model is drawn from the Level Partitions 
of Physical Access. 
 
4.2.2 Subtree Invade the Computer 
Step 2: Re-Judge the relationship between nodes and graph the Relation 
Matrix (A). 
Re-Judge the relationship between nodes: Analyzer should define the 
relationships between horizontal nodes: In the attack tree, the horizontal 
relations, which are ignored in the original attack tree, are separated into 
Additional contribute and Similar (Fig. 10b). As noted in section 2, the attack 
"WEP crack" can be a condition that makes the node “password crack” at-tack 
complete in the subtree "invade the computer". It can also be explained that the 
“WEP crack” can affect the “password crack” attack. Hence, this relationship 
is defined as additional contributions. Thus, a new path from "password crack" 
pointing to "WEP crack" can be added between nodes. Besides, the attack of 
"deceive to download malware" is a similar motion to the attack of "drive by 
download". This relation is defined as a similar relationship. Because it is 
unlikely that they would not affect one another, a path is added between them 
to express the relation. 
 
 
            (a) Indicate the nodes                               (b)Define the relationship between  
                                                                                           horizontal nodes 
Fig. 10. Subtree: Invade the Computer 
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Graph the Relation Matrix (A): Similar to the action with subtree Physical 
Access, Fig. 11a shows the Relation Matrix(A) for subtree Invade the Computer. 
Step 3: Generate the Reachability Matrix (RX): Fig. 11b shows the 
calculation of the Reachability Matrix (RX) from the Relation Matrix. 
 
              (a)Relation Matrix(A)                                        (b)Reachability Matrix(RX) 
Fig. 11. A and RX of Invade the Computer 
 
Step 4: Level Partitions: From the Reachability Matrix (RX), the Level 
Partitions table is drawn. As shown in Fig. 12, two nodes, node16 (disguised as 
normal software) and node17 (drive by download), are merged into a new 
node16 and re-named "drive as a normal software" because they have the same 
result in the Reachability Set, Antecedent Set, Intersection Set, and Level. 
 
Fig. 12. Level Partitions of Invade the Computer 
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Step 5: Digraph: A new attack tree is drawn from Level Partitions of Invade 
the Computer (Fig. 13b). 
 
(a) Model of Physical Access     (b) Model of Invade the Computer 
Fig. 13. Digraph of the two subtrees 
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5. Discussion 
This paper aims to answer three questions (RQs) about our method: 
• RQ1: Does revising by ISM ensure that the relations between parent nodes 
and child nodes satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition? 
• RQ2: Does rebuilding by ISM enhance the degree of efficiency of the attack 
tree? 
• RQ3: Is the cost to rebuild a new attack tree by ISM worth the effort? 
1)  RQ1: We separated this RQ into two aspects. The first is whether the child 
nodes are sufficient conditions for parent nodes on the attack tree after the ISM 
revision. When "go through the door" or "go through the window" is true, then 
the condition "reach room2" must be true. In other words, "go through the door" 
or "go through the window" refers to "reach room2". It is trivial that the answer 
for the statement is true. The second is whether the child nodes are necessary 
conditions for parent nodes in the attack tree after the ISM revision. There are 
only two ways ("go through the door" or "go through the window") that the 
statement "reach room2" is true. "Reach room2" must refer to "go through the 
door" or "go through the window". Combining the two parts provides a 
conclusion. Based on the complete sets of nodes, the relations between parent 
nodes and child nodes satisfy necessary and sufficient conditions after revising 
by ISM method. 
However, the complete sets of nodes are affected by other factors such as 
knowledge limitations of the tree builder or the property of each tree system. 
Sometimes there is an error due to logical mistakes during the tree rebuilding 
process. To ensure the relations between parent-child nodes are satisfied with 
necessary and sufficient conditions on the new attack tree, the relations should 
be rechecked after revising. 
2) RQ2: When we analyze an attack tree, we usually use the probability or 
cost estimating method to determine the values of possible attacks. For example, 
Yan Liu [13] mentioned a way to conduct probability analysis on an attack tree. 
They produced an attack tree whose target is "compromise web plat-form 
security" with eight child nodes. In this analysis, they referenced the attacked 
possibility for each path. These values might come from the true data, estimated 
values over time, cost consuming, feasibility, and the difficulty by specialist. 
When the number of nodes increases, the work amount to estimate the 
possibility becomes larger. Take the true data before as an example, the 
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statistics data become increasing large as the nodes increase. On the other hand, 
when the number of nodes and paths are reduced by analyzing parallel nodes 
relations, the probability analysis time is minimized. According to the different 
situations, if an attack tree has large number of nodes, then the relations between 
nodes are more com-plex. In this content, the enhancing efficiency is much 
more obvious due to the large amounts of nodes and paths, which can be 
reduced. 
3) RQ3: Due to the range of efficiency caused by the difference in the number 
of nodes and the difference of analysis methods, quantitative analysis is difficult. 
The more nodes present, the more that nodes can be reduced. Although the ISM 
matrix becomes more complex and harder to calculate manually due to the 
increase in nodes, the matrix can be calculated automatically by programming 
systems. In other words, it is not an extremely laborious task. 
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6. Conclusion 
Attacks are often used as a model analyzing method in system security 
analysis due to the complexity of a system. An attack tree may become very 
large, which leads to two problems: 1) incorrect logic between parent-child 
nodes and 2) ignored parallel relationships in different branch nodes. The paper 
presents a definition between parent-child nodes and suggests a method to repair 
an attack tree with an incorrect relation of parent-child nodes or ignored 
horizontal relation-ships. 
Our method defines the Necessary and Sufficient Relation-ship between 
Parent-Child Nodes: 1) A child node must be the sufficient condition for parent 
nodes. 2) A set of child nodes must be the necessary condition for commands 
of parent nodes. Meanwhile, we define two horizontal relationships: additional 
and similar. While analyzing an attack tree, we hope that analyzers can start by 
checking the relations between every child node from the subtree for parent-
child logical relations and the parallel nodes from different subtrees. Analyzers 
should re-judge the relations for nodes and restructure the at-tack tree. Finally, 
the restructure attack tree should be double checked. Although the revision and 
verification have some costs, they can verify the accuracy of the attack tree on 
logical problems, reducing the number of nodes and paths in an attack tree and 
enhancing the analysis efficiency of the attack tree. Moreover, this method is 
friendly for beginners as it simplifies the whole system by focusing on the 
relations between nodes, reducing the burden for users. 
Due to the instability in analyzing nodes relations manual-ly, in the future, 
we would like to find a rapid way to confirm the parent-child nodes' relations. 
Additionally, we plan to dedicate a program code to the ISM method and make 
the calculation automatic in order to decrease the rebuilding time and further 
improve the efficiency of the system. 
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